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UCL Interaction Centre, UK
ABSTRACT
The rapid development of online learning is opening up many new learning
opportunities. Yet, with this increased potential come a myriad of risks. Usable
security systems are essential as poor usability in security can result in
excluding intended users while allowing sensitive data to be released to
unacceptable recipients. This chapter presents findings concerned with usability
for two security issues: authentication mechanisms and privacy. Usability
issues such as memorability, feedback, guidance, context of use and concepts
of information ownership are reviewed within various environments. This
chapter also reviews the roots of these usability difficulties in the culture clash
between the non-user-oriented perspective of security and the information
exchange culture of the education domain. Finally an account is provided of
how future systems can be developed which maintain security and yet are still
usable.
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INTRODUCTION
The World Wide Web is facilitating new forms of remote education. These
online environments provide a wealth of possibilities for supporting learning through-
out the world. Yet, with the many opportunities come a myriad of risks. Risks to the
system and its data can dramatically affect users’ perceptions of a system’s
reliability and trustworthiness. Whether these infractions are malicious or accidental,
they can have serious repercussions for a system and its administrators. Security is
therefore essential to retain users’ trust in an online learning program.
Although security is an essential part of any system it should not impede the
original objectives of that system. However, security mechanisms and their poor
implementation have been found to present serious usability problems. There are two
principal security issues, authentication and privacy, where usability is a source of
problems for online learning systems (OLS). Initially, users encounter a variety of
usability problems with authentication procedures, such as passwords, which incur
high user overheads or are simply unworkable. The result is that users either try to
circumvent the mechanisms or use other systems to complete their task (Adams &
Sasse, 1999c; Adams, Sasse, & Lunt, 1997; Holmström, 1999; Preece, 2000;
Whitten & Tygar, 1999). Users seeking to protect their privacy encounter further
complex usability problems. These usability issues often relate to concepts of
ownership (e.g., intellectual property rights, copyright, privacy rights). Many OLS,
however, do not provide adequate feedback or control rights (Adams, 1999; Bellotti
& Sellen, 1993; Preece, 2000). Although some usability issues only relate to specific
online settings, others are more universal.
For security mechanisms in OLS to effectively protect our information they
must be designed appropriately to the users’ needs. Usability, in this sense, would
relate to providing users with adequate control to protect their data. In this context,
users may be the providers of learning materials, in which case the concern is
commonly over authorised access to proprietary learning materials. Alternatively,
users may be learners, in which case the concern may be over their answers to
questions, their results or even their images (notably in videoconferencing systems,
where even matters as apparently trivial as the quality of a video image can affect
perceptions enormously). Various OLS, however, do not provide adequate feedback
or control rights to allow this control.
This chapter details why we need security in OLS and the factors underpinning
how that security is provided within various environments. A review is also provided
of the fundamental differences between the culture of security and online learning
that produce clashes between the two disciplines. These clashes are often the root
cause of usability issues in security mechanisms for OLS. Finally, an account is
provided of how future systems can be developed which maintain security and yet
are still usable.
Ultimately, this chapter seeks to review three important concerns:
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• why current security mechanisms, frequently used in online learning programs,
lack usability;
• why the current security discipline, which is not user centred, leads to serious
security risks being overlooked;
• how security mechanisms in online education programs can be developed to be
both usable and secure.
BACKGROUND
Security issues such as authenticating users, intellectual property rights and
privacy are certain to increase in the new millennium with the development of new
ubiquitous learning technologies. With the growth of such technologies, security
breaches are becoming more frequent and their impact is increasing. Security is,
therefore, a vital part of an online learning system (OLS) to ensure that only
appropriate people have access to it and the information it contains. Computer
security has developed various mechanisms to aid in system and information
protection within online environments. However, there are many issues that reduce
the effectiveness of these devices.
Despite considerable resources being spent on security mechanisms and their
maintenance (e.g., password resetting, encryption techniques), breaches and asso-
ciated problems are still increasing (DeAlvare, 1990; Hitchings, 1995; Sasse,
Brostoff, & Weirich, 2001). Many of these security breaches are directly related to
users (e.g., poor password design, security knowledge). The technique of social
engineering specifically exploits users’ lack of security awareness to breach
security (i.e., obtaining access to information by deception or persuasion). It appears
that, currently, hackers pay more attention to human factors than do security
designers. Davis and Price (1987) have argued that, as security is designed,
implemented, used and breached by people, human factors should be considered in
the design of security mechanisms. However, the security domain relates the
problem to user weaknesses rather than usability issues (Adams & Sasse, 1999c;
Sasse et al., 2001; Schneier, 2000).
When assessing the level of security required for different information, the
security domain again disregards users’ perceptions. It has been argued that ethically
there are many inalienable privacy rights that should never be disregarded when
developing systems (Davies, 1997). Similarly it is also maintained that privacy
experts understand potential privacy risks at a greater depth than users (Bennett,
1997). However, privacy is socially determined, being defined by our perceptions of
it. To be private, therefore, relies on our perception of ourselves as secluded from
a public environment (Goffman, 1969; Wacks, 1989). Taking this into account,
therefore, the importance of users’ perceptions in designing privacy mechanisms is
paramount. It is interesting to note that of all the invasions of privacy identified by
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Adams and Sasse (1999a, 1999b, 2001), none was intentional or malicious but all
were related to design issues (e.g., poor feedback, inappropriate design, inadequate
user control).
The culture of the security discipline thus has a significant effect on how
security is developed and administered. Of key importance is that usability, until
recently, was not considered an important aspect of security design. We highlight
how this oversight relates to the culture of the security discipline. Furthermore we
highlight how the culture of security clashes with that of the online learning domain
to produce further usability problems.
Culture of Security
Despite the importance of usability of security mechanisms, there is very little
research in this field. The handful of publications that exist all argue that previous
research is limited, technically biased and for use by professionals (Adams, 2000;
Adams & Sasse, 1999; Adams et al., 1997; Holmström, 1999; Sasse et al., 2001;
Whitten & Tygar; 1999). Users’ poor security knowledge, behaviours and education
are often criticised rather than the usability of security mechanisms. To understand
the lack of usability research in this field and the adversarial approach to security
implementation we must review the cultural roots of this discipline.
The security discipline has, until recently, regarded the development of security
systems as solely a technical issue. Users’ work practices, organisational strategies
and usability factors are rarely considered during the design and implementation of
most security mechanisms today. It could be argued that many of these issues are
not reviewed because the off-line roots of security lie in the militia and mathematics.
It should therefore be of no surprise then that online solutions should be technically
biased, mathematically complex (e.g., cryptography) and dependent on organisational
hierarchies. Hitchings (1995) argues that this perspective has produced security
mechanisms that are much less effective than they are generally thought to be. This
technically biased approach could be the cause of poor usability design in many
security systems. However, within the security domain, these problems are further
complicated by its military-style culture.
The authoritarian approach of security has led to the security discipline’s
reluctance to communicate with users. Parker (1992) has noted that a major doctrine
of security, adopted from the military, is the need-to-know principle. This principle
assumes that the more known about a system’s security, the easier it is to attack.
Informing users about security mechanisms and threats is seen as lowering security
by increasing the possibility of information leaks. Part of a system’s defence,
therefore, is to restrict information only to those who need-to-know. Ultimately this
approach produces a tendency to inform users as little as possible. This lack of
communication results in users being uninformed and thus lacking security aware-
ness. Security departments, conversely, lack knowledge about users and produce
security mechanisms and systems which are not usable.
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It is important to note that the security discipline’s perspective of users is as a
risk to be controlled. When users are considered within security, it is often as the
weakest link in the security chain (Schneier, 2000). Users’ insecure work practices
and low security motivation have been identified by information security research as
a major problem that must be addressed (Davis & Ganesan, 1993; DeAlvare, 1990;
Ford, 1994). Security departments’ approach to these problems, however, is not to
discover the specific causes to address, but to place the blame on users’ security
knowledge and motivation. The traditional military culture of security assumes that
users are not inherently motivated towards these behaviours. It is assumed that users
will lack security motivation until they are made aware or forced into completing
secure behaviours. However, recent research reveals that users’ insecure work
practices and low security motivation can be caused by poor user-centred design of
security mechanisms and policy. Moreover, forcing users to conform may only
produce a facade of them having completed secure actions (Adams & Sasse, 1999c,
2001).
The culture of the security domain determines the type of security problems
identified and the approach to potential solutions. To date, the security discipline has
focused on malicious intruders and technological solutions rather than users’
perceptions and usability. These guiding principles have produced technical mecha-
nisms that are both unusable and inappropriate solutions.
Whitten and Tygar (1999) propose that users’ understanding of security is
impeded by the complexity of security mechanisms (e.g., email encryption mecha-
nisms). Current mechanisms, such as PGP (pretty good privacy), are identified as
too difficult and confusing for a conventional computer user. Holmström (1999) and
Adams and Sasse (1999c) argue that this is because security features in current
software are technology orientated. This impedes the systems’ usability, as users are
required to have a basic knowledge of the underlying technology to use the systems
correctly.
Within the sphere of user authentication, the technical bias of the discipline has
produced mechanisms that are restrictive and authoritarian. Security measures have
centred on forcing the user towards secure behaviours by enforcing more restrictive
authentication regimes, such as:
• increasing change regimes (change password once a month);
• longer and more complex passwords (alphanumeric and required length);
• reduction in allowed input error rates.
Adams et al. (1997) found, however, that the effect of these measures is the
opposite of that intended. The more restrictive security mechanisms are, the more
likely it is that users will evade them, resulting in behaviours which are even less
secure. A dramatic decrease in usability is identified as the cause of this apparent
paradox, as more restrictions in authentication mechanisms create more usability
problems. Current procedures are circumvented because user costs are too high
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(e.g., time-consuming) while the benefits (i.e., increased security) are rarely
established for users. The causes of these user costs are often security mechanisms
and policies that do not take account of users’ work practices. Systems are
subsequently designed which, in practice, are at best impractical and at worst
impossible. Users were also found to be highly security-conscious if they perceived
the need for these actions (i.e., obvious external threats).
The field of privacy has concentrated more on policies and mechanisms that
increase users’ trust in the systems (Preece, 2000). However, experts’ rather than
users’ viewpoints direct the identification of problems and potential solutions. To
date, security experts have concentrated on protecting the individual against a
malicious invasion of privacy. This perspective reveals the adversarial nature of the
security domain. However, as this chapter will identify, many invasions of privacy
occur unintentionally through poor interface design.
The technical predisposition of the security discipline has resulted in a focus on
the security of data rather than the user (Clarke, 1997). Privacy solutions centre on
technical mechanisms (e.g., encryption tools) and policies without understanding
how users perceive online systems or the mechanisms in question (Diffie & Landau,
1998; Needham & Schroeder, 1978). These mechanisms are based on the traditional
personal information assumptions, i.e., that potentially invasive information only
relates to data that identifies the individual. This approach leads to the conclusion that
to make the data, or the user, anonymous would take away the ability to identify them
personally and thus secure their privacy. However, with the development of complex
online learning environments, the issues of the future may not be well met by this
narrow perspective.
Online Learning Systems Culture Clash With Security
 Within the realm of education and learning, an ethos tends to prevail of
cooperation and collaboration. A course of study is presented so as to encourage
students to assimilate and understand it. Online learning systems (OLS) seek to
encourage trust, information sharing and freedom of expression to develop an
environment that is appropriate for learning.
With the growth of networked services, more and more people from different
backgrounds and cultures with varying skills are using online learning programs.
Online services seek, if sometimes inadequately, to support and aid these students
in their educational goals. It is important to understand when designing these systems
that we are social creatures who relate to each other via social norms for specific
situations and surroundings. Online learning systems must facilitate users from vastly
different cultures and backgrounds in establishing a joint understanding of the social
norms for that system. Furthermore the continual intake of new users at the beginning
of courses means that the acquisition of the OLS culture must be quickly and easily
assimilated. To facilitate the effective development of these norms requires the
communication and adaptability often provided by reputable educational establish-
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ments and their online systems. The theme of this book also highlights the importance
within the education discipline and for usability principles of communication,
feedback and the free flow of information.
It is important to understand how the non-user-orientated perspective of
security clashes with the information exchange culture of the education domain. The
current focus of the security community on technical mechanisms to enforce and
protect desired behaviours does not fit well within a learning environment. The
learning arena thrives upon a tradition of trust, information exchange and discussion.
The security domain, in contrast, relies on a culture of distrust, restricted information
flow and autocratic rules. It should also be noted that students do not respond well
to the traditional authoritarian approach of many security departments.
What is of increased importance is how the clash between these two disciplines
can be seen as the root of many usability difficulties with security in online learning
systems. Within the domain of online learning, users relate to the established norms
of feedback and help when they encounter usability problems. However, usability
problems encountered with security mechanisms are often not supported by
traditional help facilities. Users’ isolation encourages contrary perceptions of the
system working against, rather than with, them. The segregation of those traditionally
placed to help users (e.g., tutors, administrators) form an understanding of security
mechanisms further increases potential usability problems.
Ultimately, a new approach is required that promotes the protective aims of
security without confronting the users with unusable systems. The beginning of many
solutions starts with a reengineering of the security culture to work with, rather than
against, the user. The user, as previously noted, is a crucial link in the security chain
that must be considered as a valued asset rather than a flawed chink in the armour.
A recent move within security research has tried to counteract current security
limitations by highlighting the importance of users’ conceptual models and their
understanding of security mechanisms (Adams & Sasse, 1999c, 2001; Holmström,
1999; Whitten & Tygar, 1999). The need for more research into user-directed
security is imperative, however, as the need for security increases and our
understanding of trust is diluted in online environments.
ONLINE LEARNING SYSTEM ACCESS:
AUTHENTICATION
Security, in general terms, is often taken to mean protection from danger. With
regard to computer security, that danger relates to malicious or accidental misuse
(Neumann, 1995). Computer security, therefore, tends to concentrate on human
misuse rather than computer malfunctions. Two important aspects of security are
confidentiality and integrity. Confidentiality is concerned with protection of
information from unauthorised access, while integrity refers to maintaining the
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unimpaired condition of both the system and the data used.  Both confidentiality and
integrity closely relate to the endeavour of making sure that misuse does not impact
on computer reliability. Ultimately, security seeks to ensure that learning resources
are available, unimpaired, to all authorised users when they are needed. To maintain
the commercial viability of online learning systems (OLS) it is therefore vital to
ensure that the people who pay for services have access while other non-authorised
users are excluded. To retain this access to unimpaired data it is necessary to deal
with issues of authentication and ownership. It is essential that the appropriate people
have access to information with the correct data manipulation rights (Preece, 2000).
Security issues, however, are often not directly considered by online learning
administrators. Articles that do review security issues for online learning systems
tend to concentrate on issues of intellectual property rights and copyright law
(Diotalevi, 2000; McAlister, Rivera, & Hallam, 2001). Recent articles, however, are
identifying further security issues for OLS, especially with regard to user feedback
and assessment (Bateman, 2000; McAlister et al.). McAlister et al. notes that
authenticating a user is especially important when assessing students’ progress
online. However, administering this authentication is troublesome as normal security
procedures (e.g., seeing the student complete the assessment unaided) are not
applicable in many online scenarios. It is suggested that if identification for
assessment purposes is essential then local supervised sessions could be provided.
Authentication Stages and Methods
Authentication is pivotal to the concept of confidentiality but it also relates to
integrity. To maintain appropriate access to information and yet protect it from
unsanctioned manipulation, it is crucial accurately to authenticate users.
Authentication procedures are usually divided into two stages. The first stage,
user identification (User ID), identifies the user interacting with the system. As it
is merely a means of specifying who the user is, this ID does not have to be secured.
Once the user is identified the second stage, user authentication, verifies them as
the legitimate user of that ID. The means of authentication, therefore, must remain
secret.
There are three different ways to authenticate a user by an online learning
program (Garfinkel & Spafford, 1996):
1. Knowledge-based authentication: The user tells the computer something only
they know (e.g., password).
2. Token-based authentication: The user shows the computer something only they
possess (e.g., a key card).
3. Biometrics: The user themselves is measured by the computer (e.g., finger-
print).
Security research has tended to concentrate on technical mechanisms for
authentication (e.g., iris scanning, smart cards). However, although these technolo-
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gies have great potential in future applications, passwords and personal identification
numbers (PINs) are currently the most widely used form of authentication. Even
where the other forms of authentication (i.e., token-based or biometrics) are used,
they are invariably reinforced by the use of a PIN or password. Knowledge-based
authentication has the advantage of being both simple and economical. These two
factors probably account for its universal appeal and ensure its use for many systems
and years to come.
One of the problems with popular knowledge-based authentication mecha-
nisms, such as passwords and PINs, are their poor usability. Current mechanisms
rely on users to recall data to be input rather than recognising the correct authorisation
information. To counteract these problems there are a wide variety of knowledge-
based authentication mechanisms that claim to be more usable and yet secure:
• passphrases (a phrase required instead of a word);
• cognitive passwords (question-and-answer session of personal details);
• associative passwords (a series of words and associations);
• passfaces (user selection of faces).
However, the take-up of these mechanisms has, to date, been limited (Sasse et
al., 2001). One-word passwords and PINs are still the easiest and cheapest to apply
and thus most often implemented.
Passwords: Security Issues
Passwords are either system- or user-generated, with the former ensuring a
more “secure” combination of characters in the password than the latter. However,
users find system-generated passwords are not usable (i.e., hard to remember
correctly) and so have been found to write them down, thus decreasing security.
Furthermore, the process of distributing system-generated passwords often led to
increased security risks (i.e., unauthorised access to the passwords). Both of these
reasons have led to user-generated passwords as the most widely used process for
password production.
The level of security provided by user-generated passwords can vary greatly,
depending on the individual user’s password design expertise and security aware-
ness. When generating a password its crackability is often vastly underrated by
users (Davis & Ganesan, 1993). There are, however, several criteria that should be
used to ensure a reasonable level of password security (Federal Information
Processing Standars, 1985).
Password composition is a vital element in a password’s crackability. A
password composed of characters chosen from a large character set decreases its
level of crackability. An alphanumeric password is therefore more secure than one
composed of letters only. The lifetime of a password (i.e., change regimes) relates
to the frequency with which the composition of a password is required to be changed.
Some systems apply a strict change regime, e.g., requiring passwords to be changed
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every 30 days and not to repeat one of the past 10 chosen. However, it must be
understood that change regimes do not actually increase security, but decrease the
damage that can be done once a breach has occurred. In addition, frequent change
regimes are only required for highly confidential information. The sensitivity of the
information protected should, therefore, be considered before introducing frequent
change regimes. Finally, the security domain emphasises the importance of
individual ownership of passwords because they:
• increase individual accountability;
• reduce illicit usage;
• make it possible to audit system usage;
• reduce frequent password changes due to group membership fluctuations.
Ultimately, the level of security a password affords is tightly interwoven with
its design. However, support for users on password design is often very limited.
Passwords: Usability Issues and Solutions
Security systems should be deemed ineffective and unusable if the user costs
(mental overhead, time-consuming, etc.) and computer costs (costly implementation,
continual system updating) are high and yet the overall security of the systems is low.
By these standards, the desired performance of most security mechanisms is
unacceptable. The consequences of inadequate usability, however, are high : Poor
usability of security mechanisms can result in excluding intended users while allowing
sensitive data to be released to unacceptable recipients. There are a wide variety of
usability problems within password systems. However, this section will initially
review the major issues associated with users’ memory limitations and how to
counteract those problems by increasing password memorability. Further issues of
poor feedback and guidance are presented with potential solutions including guidance
in password design. Finally the importance of understanding the context of use with
regard to password usability is evaluated.
Memorability.  As technology infiltrates more aspects of people’s lives, the
number of PINs and passwords required can become excessive. Most people have
a PIN for a bank card, mobile phone, voice mail and even entry door systems. A
multitude of passwords is also required in our daily lives; for logging on to networks,
specific applications and a multitude of Web sites. Online learning programs are also
inclined to use passwords rather than other forms of authentication. The result is a
considerable challenge for users, not just in terms of the number of items to recall but
the complexity of the information to be memorised.
Authentication mechanisms, often unnecessarily, increase the memory load on
users. Most systems allow the user to choose a PIN or password, to increase its
memorability. However, the user’s choice is often constrained by security param-
eters, for example, that it has to be of a certain length or format. This is because the
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security of a password system ultimately relies on the level of security afforded by
the password content. With the use of dictionary checkers, a short alphanumeric
password affords more security than a longer word (since alphanumeric strings are
not listed in such dictionaries). A password’s content, though, also affects its level
of memorability. As Carroll (1996) observes, the very characteristics that make a
password more secure (e.g., long, nonsensical combinations) also make it less
memorable. A word can be far more memorable than a nonsensical combination, but
the security afforded by the former is far less than the latter. A password system’s
security and its memorability, therefore, lie in the hands of the user. Users are
required to construct a memorable combination within the security constraints
provided, often within a short time frame, and are rarely given feedback on how to
construct these passwords (Adams & Sasse, 1999c; Adams et al., 1997; Sasse et al.,
2001). Many users feel they are forced into circumventing unusable security
procedures, which decreases their security motivation. Hackers using social
engineering techniques rely on the lowered security motivation of users to breach
security mechanisms. A simple phone call or email, together with users’ poor security
awareness, is all that is required.
Another serious constraint on password memorability is the implementation of
change regimes. Harsh change regimes (e.g., password changed once a month,
once every 3 months) not only decrease the memorability of a password system but
also increase security risks. Adams and Sasse (1999c) found that users who were
required to change their passwords frequently produced less secure passwords and
disclosed their passwords more frequently. The increased security risks (e.g., writing
down passwords, poor security motivation) incurred by introducing frequent change
regimes should also be considered before introducing these measures.
Finally another interface flaw, which increases the users’ memory burden, is a
failure to clearly distinguish between the openly disclosed aspects of user identifica-
tion (ID) and the undisclosed secret aspects of the password section. Adams et al.
(1997) found that many users confused user identification (user IDs) and the
password sections of the authentication process. Without knowledge of the authen-
tication process, users assumed that these IDs were another form of password to be
secured and recalled in the same manner. Recall of the user ID then became an extra
memory burden on the user. User confusions were found to be related to authenti-
cation mechanisms which automatically allocated user IDs as nonwords without
meaning. Even when authentication systems require a user’s name, they do not state
the format that it is required in. Consequently users returning to one of many systems
they use encounter problems remembering which form of their name they need for
this system (e.g., A. Adams; A. L. Adams; Anne Adams; anne adams).
Increasing password memorability.  An important aspect of usability is to
design user recognition into a system rather than relying on users’ abilities to recall
information. However, passwords rely on users’ long-term memory, with all its
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limitations and flaws. This has produced efforts to identify mechanisms for gener-
ating memorable yet secure passwords which rely on users’ recognition rather than
recall abilities (Barton & Barton 1988; DeAlvare, 1990; Sasse et al., 2001). The
impact of these recommendations, however, seems to have been limited, in that few
developers are aware of them (e.g., passfaces, associative passwords, etc.).
One serious impediment to the recall of passwords is the interference in
retrieving the information from memory caused by the increasing numbers of
passwords requiring memorisation. A technical solution to this problem has been
suggested, in the form of a single sign-on (Adams & Sasse, 1999c). With this method
of authentication, systems are interlinked only for authentication purposes and the
user can use one password for multiple systems. However, if this approach is
technically inappropriate or too expensive, there are non-technical solutions. If the
security afforded by a single password is acceptable, users should be advised to use
a single password for all systems. It should be noted, though, that from a security
perspective there could be some problems with this approach as different systems
hold more sensitive information (e.g., exam marks, tutors’ course-work comments)
than others and require tighter security protocols. What must be emphasised to the
users is that linked (e.g., tom1, tom2, tom3) passwords should not be used for
different systems as they have a lower memorability than unlinked (e.g., to2m, pofad,
sa11y) passwords (Adams et al., 1997), in terms of which password applies to which
system. It must also be noted that the memory advantages of single sign-on can be
counteracted if frequent change regimes are introduced since interference will still
reduce password memorability (i.e., interference between old and new passwords).
Some memory aids are a useful tool in increasing the memorable content of
passwords without decreasing its level of security. Initial letters of a sentence or a
rhyme can look like a complex secure password combination (e.g., 12Bms34Kotd)
and yet be memorable with an appropriate cue (e.g. 1, 2 Buckle my shoe. 3, 4 Knock
on the door). If the sentence cue relates to the interaction task then for many users
this can increase the password memorability still further. For some users, the pattern
of the input keys on the keyboard can greatly aid memorability. However, this aid is
a better support for frequently used password or PIN numbers and can cause
problems if a frequent change regime is employed.
Finally, as previously mentioned, many user authentication mechanisms incur
further memorability problems by not distinguishing between the user ID and the
password sections of the authentication procedure. It is important that the interface
of a user authentication system clearly highlights the difference between these
sections. Currently the only distinction provided between these sections is the
standard feedback for the ID data input (e.g., anne adams) and a secret feedback
for the password data input (e.g., *****). As the user ID section does not require
free recall to increase security it can be prompted. It could increase the usability of
these systems if, instead of asking for a user ID, they presented a box asking for the
user’s first name followed by a box asking for a surname. If the ID section accepted
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the data in either case (upper or lower), this could further increase the system’s
usability.
Feedback and guidance.  One major problem with all security mechanisms
is the distinct lack of user support provided. Adams et al. (1997) found that limited
and unsuitable feedback in security systems can produce inappropriate, time-
consuming user actions and pointless interactions. Whitten and Tygar (1999) also
point out that to prevent dangerous errors, appropriate feedback is essential. An
essential aid to system usability, therefore, is the provision of simple, straightforward,
accurate documentation for user support and help facilities. However, it is difficult
for security mechanisms to provide these facilities because the system needs to aid
the user without supporting security breaches (Sasse et al., 2001). There is,
therefore, an important balancing act between usability and security. For example,
a user having recently returned from a vacation types in their password; the system
states it is incorrect; the user is certain that this is their password, so assumes they
have typed it in incorrectly and types it again; the system again states that it is
incorrect; and the user tries one last time and is shut out of the system. How could
the system have supported the user without decreasing security by aiding an
unauthorised user? Often to increase usability, prompts are used to guide the user
through a task. However, providing prompts or clues about the password to the user
would increase security risks. Associative passwords (i.e., a series of words and
associations) could be used as a backup, because although they are time-consuming
they are cheaper and quicker than password reinstatement procedures. Another
prompt that could be provided would be for the user to receive some simple feedback,
for example, reminding them that the system is case-sensitive. As noted by Adams
et al. (1997), many users have problems with passwords not because they have
forgotten the password but simply that they have forgotten that the system is case-
sensitive. This feedback would potentially support some users and yet not decrease
security since most hackers assume case-sensitivity in their cracking attempts.
Not only do users require support in their use of authentication mechanisms but
also in the design or choice of passwords. Users also have to develop rules for using
passwords which satisfy the criteria for a secure password and, at the same time,
minimise the burden on themselves. As Adams and Sasse (1999c) observe, however,
users are rarely given support in these procedures (e.g., how to design effective
passwords, manage your security, interact with the system, reinstate forgotten
passwords, change passwords). Users’ lack of basic knowledge was found to result
in them making their own judgements about which practices are secure, and these
judgements are often wildly inaccurate. We suggest that the reason behind poor user
support and usability of security mechanisms lies in the security culture of reduced
communication with users. The solution is to provide open support and guidance in
password construction and secure behaviours. The support provided, however,
should not take the traditional authoritarian approach (e.g., tell us what you’re doing
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wrong so we can reprimand you). Two-way communication should be established
so that users and security designers are encouraged to think of security as a joint
responsibility, with security administrators acknowledging users’ needs and work
practices.
Understanding the context of use.  When designing an authentication screen
it is important to understand the user’s context of use. The mental model that users
have of the relationship between the virtual- and real-world library is essential if
security procedures rely on them. A recent study we conducted, within an UK
academic setting, identified problems with access to a digital library. Users who
initially attempted to access digital libraries online were presented with no informa-
tion about what specific authentication was required (e.g., an Athens ID and
password), how to obtain these details and who to contact if they had any problems
with the system. As with many online learning programs the only information
provided in the authentication process was a screen asking for user ID and password.
Users became further confused when they found out (via off-line sources) that they
had to physically attend their local library to obtain a password in order to remotely
access digital libraries. Further research into these usability problems identified that
users’ understanding of the context is complicated by the inconsistent use of
terminology. In this example, users were confused when the name for the online
learning system (i.e., OVID) did not correspond with the name of the system required
to access it (i.e., Athens password and ID).
Further terminology problems can be encountered when technical terms such
as ID are used without detailing what they relate to or how to enter the required
information (e.g., case-sensitive, limited number of characters). The use of these
terms between systems is also frequently inconsistent. For example, one popular
online system not only asks for an access ID, but also an authentication ID and a
password. There is no explanation about the differences between these components
and their different security levels. The use of multiple types of IDs also increases the
potential for user errors in remembering and entering these items.
Users confused by inconsistencies within and between systems are even more
confused by similarities between different digital library authentication mechanisms.
In our digital library study, it was found that users would effortlessly jump between
digital libraries, but frequently became disorientated about which library they were
currently accessing. Users frequently tried to proceed in library A using library B’s
password. Other users did not realise they had followed a link from one library to
another and that further registration was required. Unaware of their errors, users
were often locked out of the system altogether. Ultimately, it is important to
understand that users consider authentication mechanisms as a part of the learning
interaction. When designing online learning programs we must, therefore, consider
their usability with regard to their context of use.
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PROTECTING PRIVACY IN ONLINE
LEARNING SYSTEMS
Data is increasingly being treated as property, and the ownership of that
property is fiercely debated. For example, sports organisations have claimed that
online service providers misappropriate their proprietary rights to scores. In contrast,
governments sell the rights to potentially personal information they collect. The
World Intellectual Property Organisation is continually debating the protection of
databases and expanding copyright protection for digital works (Computers, Free-
dom and Privacy, 1997). Legislative developments have not untangled this complex-
ity. Over the last 30 years U.S. courts have increasingly ruled that personal records
belong to an organisation and access to the information cannot be restricted by the
person in question (Kling, 1996).
In security terms, information ownership (i.e., intellectual property rights,
copyright, privacy rights) can determine access and manipulation rights. Issues of
ownership, therefore, relate to both confidentiality and integrity. However, it is
important to note that the users’ concept of ownership is closely intertwined with that
of privacy. It is vital, therefore, to understand users’ perceptions of information
ownership, usage and privacy when developing online learning systems. Privacy and
intellectual property rights rely on our perception of them. As well as how well we
are protected, it is also important that we perceive ourselves and our information to
be safe and private. Therefore identifying users’ perceptions of privacy and
ownership is an important element in identifying what needs to be protected and how
best to protect it.
People often feel they own data about themselves and that security should
reflect how much they feel misuse of that data could invade their privacy (Adams,
2001; Adams et al., 1997). However, with the increasing availability and use of
various data and applications, associated privacy risks, out of users’ control, are
greatly increasing (Bellotti, 1996; Neumann, 1995; Preece, 2000; Smith, 1993). Kling
(1996) suggests that over the past 30 years there has been a growing view that
computerisation has decreased people’s privacy. Computerisation, however, is not
the only culprit in people’s perceptions of decreased privacy. Slow-to-react
organisations have played a key role in this decline: Organisations that develop
privacy policies retrospectively, after an external threat, produce policies that have
been outgrown by changes in either society or the organisation’s activities (Smith,
1993).
Just as there are many inalienable rights that should never be disregarded when
developing systems (Davies, 1997) , it is also maintained that security experts
understand potential risks at a greater depth than users (Bennett, 1997). Both these
arguments have directed security research and the identification of security require-
ments in system development towards appraisals by security experts. The problem
with only taking this approach is that any expert may have a distorted perception of
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a situation that does not reflect the perceptions of the users. Ultimately, to satisfy
users’ privacy needs, it is necessary to understand their perception of the information
being used, how it is used and those manipulating it (Adams, 2001; Adams & Sasse,
2001).
Privacy of Learners’ Working Materials
The issue of ownership when dealing with distance education can be very
complex and is often not written in stone, making it hard to apply accurately
(Diotalevi, 2000). McAlister et al. (2001) suggest that it is important to establish
ownership rights and compensations prior to offering Web courses to minimise future
misunderstandings. However, problems often occur because of difficulties in
distinguishing what information needs to be protected and by whom (Adams, 1999a,
1999b, 2000). These fundamental issues often lead to inappropriate design of security
mechanisms that, in turn, provide poor usability for safeguarding what users want
protected.
Despite information ownership being a complex issue, students perceive their
ownership of the essays and course work they produce as straightforward. It is
important that users can rely upon an online learning system to protect their
information from misuse (Preece, 2000). Users’ control over access rights to this
information, however, is sometimes negated by system settings. A particular worry
for students is that when working online their documents will be viewed before they
feel ready for them to be accessed. A student whose course work or assessment
mark is available to others, without their prior knowledge, will be less willing to use
the system in the future. Previous research into multimedia educational systems has
identified the importance of freedom of expression in the learning process.
However, our ability to express ourselves free from social inhibitors relies upon a
secure context for private expression and autonomy (Schoeman, 1992). Adams
(2001) found that students were negative when online learning systems allowed
tutors automatic viewing rights to them (e.g., video-conferencing systems) or their
work without their control or prior knowledge. Cranor, Reagle, and Ackerman (1999)
also found that users have a particular dislike of the automatic transfer of data about
themselves and their patterns of use.
Although monitoring learners’ progress and participation in learning applica-
tions is vital, it must be carefully applied. Users’ security needs (e.g., privacy) are
occasionally overlooked when developing monitoring mechanisms. Tracking devices
used to tailor learning situations for the user can be invasive if information is
inappropriately obtained and applied. Intelligent agents that identify information
requirements can invade users’ privacy, depending on how the information is used.
These issues are further complicated within an online environment, where trust in a
faceless entity is difficult, technology distorts social interactions, and social norms
vary across continents. Poor usability in protecting online users’ rights can have
serious consequences as users lose trust and reject the technology in question
(Adams, 1999a, 1999b, 2000; Adams & Sasse, 2001; Preece, 2000).
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Ultimately, the importance of correctly applying security for online learning
programs should not be underestimated. A study of United States users found that
protecting personal information privacy should increase Internet usage 78%
amongst those who already use it and 61% for those who currently do not (Harris
& Westin, 1998). These figures show the economic importance of these issues for
online learning systems. One way to protect sensitive information transmitted over
the Internet is through encryption. Electronic cryptography provides a collection of
techniques for encoding communications so that only their intended recipients can
understand them.
Encryption Techniques—PGP
It is important in any communications that the sender is assured that what they
send is what is received, without any unauthorised access and manipulation.
Encryption tools are often used to ensure the integrity of the data and the authorised
nature of the recipient. The potential advantages of these tools for online learning are
clear: Course work or sensitive emails can be communicated with the students’
confidence that they are private. The usability of these techniques, however, is
debateable.
The marketers of PGP (pretty good privacy), a popular document transfer
encryption tool, claim that its graphical user interface allows novice computer users
to utilise complex mathematical cryptography. Whitten and Tygar (1999), however,
have identified problems with the terminology used by PGP. The system designers
have tried to steer away from complex cryptographic terminology by using real-
world terms, but those terms are used in uncharacteristic ways. For example, in the
real world the same key is used to lock and unlock a door. However, in cryptography
and in particular PGP, there is a distinction made between public and private keys.
PGP presents no online help to explain the important distinction between these two
key icons. Users were either left to work out the distinctions based on other key type
data, thumb through a 132-page manual or misinterpret the metaphor. Similarly a
signature is another cryptographic term that would imply, invoking the real-world
metaphor, the use of a mechanism to sign a document. However, within PGP the
term is used to denote a step in the encryption procedure (along with private keys)
rather than simply signing a document. Even once users understand the terms used
within PGP, their use is further complicated by system inconsistencies. Throughout
the process the terms encryption and signing are used, but once the system is
encrypting, it presents feedback on the process stating that the system is currently
encoding.
Ultimately, the language and structure of security mechanisms can often
decrease system usability. Whitten and Tygar (1999) identified that the poor usability
of PGP meant that two thirds of their study participants could not encrypt their data
within 90 minutes of using the application. Worse than this was that one-quarter of
the users in the study accidentally emailed their secret data unencrypted. Re-
348   Adams & Blandford
Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written
permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.
designing the interface, however, could have solved many of the usability problems.
Several usability issues arose from the metaphors used, which encouraged users to
develop inappropriate assumptions about the interface (e.g., keys, signatures). A
redesign would have to develop the system to comply with real-world metaphor
assumptions (e.g., a key opens and locks a door, a signature identifies who sent a
communication but does not make it private). The system also used technical jargon
inconsistently, which should be avoided.
Group Working in Videoconferencing and Virtual Reality
Systems
The primary usability considerations of online security mechanisms varies
according to the different types of online learning environments (Preece, 2000).
Online learning environments range from one-to-one text communication to
videoconferencing and virtual reality many-to-many collaboration. The greatest
challenges to security, including privacy, are presented by videoconferencing and
virtual reality systems.
Videoconferencing is increasingly being used to support online learning via
computer-supported collaborative learning (CSCL). Videoconferencing really be-
gan with the transmission of group images from one room to another via a common
monitor (Isaacs & Tang, 1997). However, multimedia communications to support
online learning came into their own with the advent of desktop videoconferencing.
Users sit in front of their computer and communicate in real time via a microphone,
camera and, often, a digital workspace. This configuration is often referred to as a
picture-in-a-picture (PIP) setup.
Virtual reality applications allow human-computer and human-human interactivity
through a sensory environment called the virtual world which is dynamically
controlled by the user’s actions. Exploration of that world for learning purposes is
often achieved via a computer-animated actor (an avatar). An avatar helps the user
relate to and collaborate with the world and other users (Granieri & Badler, 1995;
Preece, 2000).
Virtual reality (VR) environments rely heavily on the notion of immersion, both
physically and cognitively (Preece, 2000). Keyboard and monitor input devices allow
a user to be partially immersed, whilst head-mounted displays produce total
immersion in the environment. A user is cognitively immersed in the environment
when they feel immersed in the action (Fluckiger, 1995; Tromp, 1995). Initially VR
was used for entertainment and training purposes. Virtual simulations of complex
real-world systems have been used as learning environments for various conditions
(Preece, 2000; Smets, Sappers, Overbeeke, & Van Der Mast, 1995). Collaborative
VR environments provide remotely located users with the ability to collaborate via
real interactions in a shared artificial environment (Brna & Aspin, 1997). It is
frequently argued by constructivists1 that the advantages of VR for collaborative
learning relate to the authenticity of the context (Vygotsky, 1978). VR communica-
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tion environments have been argued to provide a natural, intuitive environment for
communication whilst releasing some of the social taboos from social interactions
(Kaur, 1997). However, we note that, as the realism of virtual worlds increases, users
are more likely to make inaccurate assumptions about the virtual world’s capabilities
and limitations, decreasing its usability.
Virtual reality provides an anonymous environment which, this chapter will
show, can still allow inappropriate and invasive behaviours. The focus of security
protection upon the individual may also be inadequate for threats in the future. It could
be argued that a social grouping itself has its own identity, which relates to the
individual. This would mean that although an individual is anonymous, if the social
grouping is identified then the individual is indirectly identified. Individuals could
similarly find it invasive if sensitive information is made public about anonymous
individuals from their specific school, church or social group. Online groups formed
for learning interactions must therefore be managed as a unit, with their own security
needs. It could be argued that, as our societies become larger and more multicultural,
the smaller social groupings we join which support our beliefs, feelings and biases
become more important.
User’s VC/VR Representation Projected to Others
As we move into the future of online learning systems, there are interesting
challenges for security mechanisms and their usability. The great advantages of
video-conferencing (VC) and virtual reality (VR) are already being realised by many
students. However, for us wisely to implement these technologies we must
understand potential security problems before they arise. This section reviews many
of the foreseeable usability problems through reviews of current multimedia
applications (i.e., VC and VR). It is important to note that most multimedia invasions
of privacy are not intentional or malicious but design related. Designers’ failure to
anticipate how information could be used, by whom, and how this might affect users
is a significant factor in users perceiving their privacy as having been invaded.
One significant multimedia usability issue relates to technology’s ability to
distort interactions, thus making them invasive. Ensuring that users are protected
from disclosing information they would not wish to have disclosed requires an
understanding of these issues. For example, interpersonal distance has been found
to dictate the intensity of a response: Faces in a close-up are scrutinised more often
than those in the background. Reeves and Nass (1996) argue that, because the size
of a face is more than just a representation of an individual, it can influence
psychological judgements of a person and thus become an invasive piece of
information. Similarly, image quality and camera angles might result in a perception
of the user that they regard as inaccurate. Many learning environments rely on social
interaction with peers and teachers to aid in the learning process (Preece, 2000).
However, users can misjudge the sensitivity of these interactions and the potential
threats, resulting in them not adopting appropriately secure behaviours. Similarly
350   Adams & Blandford
Copyright © 2003, Idea Group Inc. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written
permission of Idea Group Inc. is prohibited.
inaccurate assumptions could also occur because multimedia communication envi-
ronments often lack the social, physical and context cues required for users to
accurately judge the situation and adapt their behaviour accordingly. A student
collaborating in a home setting will act differently from one in a public college setting.
Videoconferencing systems that mix the two settings can produce misinterpretations
of the situation and inappropriate behaviour for a public interaction (Adams, 2001).
Privacy invasions are frequently due to inaccurate interpretation of the data
being received within an interaction. If a user’s image has been enlarged (without
their knowing it) by a recipient, this can produce the misconception that no one is
staring directly at them. In turn the user does not adjust their behaviour accordingly,
as they would if someone were staring directly at them in the real world. However,
the person receiving the data often does not realise how their actions or potential
actions with the user’s data may invade the user’s privacy. A lack of the facial and
body cues that we take for granted in real-world situations can produce an isolating
and inhibiting situation for a user. Many virtual reality environments have usability
problems with relaying proximity to the users (Preece, 2000). One result of this,
which was identified in a virtual reality learning environment, left a user feeling she
was being stalked (i.e., followed throughout the environment, stared at). However,
the stalker had no knowledge of their actions except that they had encountered
usability problems (e.g., judging their location within the environment and proximity
to other users) with their avatar.
Ultimately, technology can be used, intentionally or unintentionally, to distort
assumptions made by those using it. Multimedia environments, in particular, can incur
varied and complex privacy problems. The more realistic an environment appears,
the more assumptions a user unconsciously accepts. Video-conferencing users will
typically assume that the audio is connected to the image on screen, similarly that in
virtual reality that a wall has real-world properties and cannot be walked through.
However, these assumptions can be either maliciously or unintentionally breached.
To take a simple example, a video-conferencing system that allows someone to
freeze their video streams (e.g., so that they appear to be avidly viewing the screen
but instead have actually gone to make themselves a cup of tea) could produce an
inaccurate appraisal of their attention within the interaction. This scenario could also
produce a mismatch between the person who is actually watching the images and the
assumed person receiving the data (based on the frozen image). The user’s resulting
behaviours can be inappropriate and the potential invasiveness of the interaction
increased.
Online Learning Usability Inhibits Social Interaction and
Privacy
Previous research has identified that unacceptable behaviours can unintention-
ally occur as a result of poor feedback, isolating users from the acceptable social
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norms for the situation they are in. Often this is caused by poor interface design but
it can also arise from misconceptions of user perceptions by organisations and system
designers (Adams & Sasse, 2001). With the increase in online learning environments
supporting students throughout the world, there is an increasing variation in social and
cultural norms. With this diverse population of users, the need for accurately
establishing what is acceptable behaviour is becoming a crucial issue. As privacy
perceptions are complicated and online environments often defy real-world assump-
tions, there is a need to identify users’ perceptions within these environments.
Dourish (1993) argues that if a system is embedded in the organisational culture,
social controls will establish a culture of use that will restrict unacceptable activities.
However, many online learning systems rely on establishing a culture and associated
norms purely through online interactions (Adams, 2001). We would argue that,
although social controls are vital (especially in flatter, more open organisations),
relying on them as the only safeguard for privacy is insufficient. It is important to
understand that trust and thus social control evolves with a new technology. To
nurture this the technology must not breach users’ privacy assumptions, especially
if those assumptions are based on social cues that are distorted by the technology.
Another important factor in perceived privacy invasions is the role of those
receiving the information (Adams, 2001). Someone highly trusted may be able to
view highly sensitive information but only if they are deemed, by the user, to have an
appropriate role in the information’s usage. A tutor viewing a student’s course work
may be acceptable because of their role, the trust ensured by that role and the
organisational context. However although a student may highly trust a close friend
(e.g., disclosing relationship details not acceptable for the tutor to know), they may
not be acceptable to view their course work.
Many online systems assure users’ privacy requirements by stating their
privacy procedures and policies, assuming that this will set the user’s mind at rest.
Others use a third-party service, such as TRUSTe (Benassi, 1999), to assure users
that the company keeps within certain guidelines. However, the policies are often
rigid and do not allow for variations in how users perceive different types of
information. The usefulness of third-party services also depends upon how much the
user trusts these virtual, often unknown organisations. Reagle and Cranor (1999),
however, have found that the use of brand or real-world organisational names linked
to trust badges could reduce these problems. Providing users with links to real-world
contacts and help lines, to ensure their privacy is actively being protected, helps to
encourage trust within their virtual interaction (Adams, 2001; Preece, 2000).
Security Problems Caused by Recording and Reuse
It is important to review the permanent quality that technology can give to an
interaction. When learning interaction occurs without the aid of technology, the only
durable element is in the memories of the parties involved and the notes they take.
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However, technology-mediated interactions, whether they are text or video con-
trolled, can be recorded and reused. The implications of recording learning interac-
tions should not be underestimated. Adams and Sasse (2001) found that users’
perception of control is essential in building trust relationships for effective social
interaction. A student’s ignorance of a session being recorded or how the information
was to be used could cause them great discomfort. Imagined embarrassing
scenarios, which may be no less likely if the user had known of the recording, trigger
students’ anxiety. The important difference is the users’ perception that they would
have more control of the situation if they knew it was being recorded (Bellotti, 1997).
The simple act of recording users’ interactions can increase the sensitivity of
the data. Once an interaction is recorded it can frequently be reviewed, edited and
seen by unintended and unknown recipients. All of these events can unintentionally,
and without malice, become an invasive act. Adams and Sasse (1999b) detail how
a presentation at a conference, which was broadcast over the Internet, was recorded
initially for later viewing by students and academics. However, the recording was
later shown, without the presenter’s awareness, at a seminar to demonstrate the
technology. The presenter was later met by a friend and told of his appearance at
the seminar. The presenter was then worried about how he would appear, out of
context, to an unintended audience. The essential point illustrated by this example is
that it is important to consider the outcome of reusing information out of context: Even
if actions are not meant maliciously, they may be perceived as invasive.
Of key importance is the feedback that users are given about who is receiving
their information both currently and at a later date. Ultimately, a careful balance must
be maintained between developing an appropriate learning system and protecting the
user’s rights. It is also important to inform the students if the information is to be used
for any purpose other than those previously flagged to them.
Solution: The Importance of Feedback and Control
The escalating variety of technologies available to support online learning
increases the likelihood of complicated usability problems. With the use of multimedia
applications, the complexity of those problems increases tenfold.
One usability problem with online learning environments arises from the control
afforded students and tutors by the environments. Automatic viewing rights for tutors
or other students without users’ control or prior knowledge can cause problems.
Similarly, monitoring and tracking users’ learning interactions can be useful for tutors,
but also potentially invasive if obtained and used inappropriately. For videoconferencing,
Mackay (1995) and Bellotti and Sellen (1993) suggest that people should be made
aware that their images are being transmitted. Ultimately users should be allowed to
weigh up the information value (e.g., increased learning capabilities) against potential
privacy risks involved (e.g., embarrassing slipups) prior to the interaction taking
place. Users evaluating these factors prior to the interaction reduces the likelihood
of these invasions occurring.
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Within multimedia environments, the data transmitted is likely to be distorted and
the information received completely different from that expected by the users.
Within online learning situations, users can inaccurately judge the sensitivity of the
information they are releasing (Adams, 2001). It is important for users receiving the
data to understand how users who have transmitted it may interpret their actions with
that information. In the real world, standing too close to someone or staring at them
for too long would result in disapproving looks, coughs, sighs, etc. The user who
enlarges a student’s videoconferencing image or has their avatar standing on top of
another’s avatar receives no feedback of the inappropriateness of these behaviours.
One solution to these problems lies in providing appropriate feedback to both users
about what is being received and how distorted it is likely to be, to develop a joint
understanding of the data being transmitted. A visual representation of how they are
being seen, including the size of that image, is an essential aid to assessing its
sensitivity. It may also be useful for users to receive instructions on where to place
their cameras, with instant feedback prior to interactions taking place. Allowing the
student to review potential risks involved in a multimedia interaction can also aid them
in avoidance behaviours. This feedback is easier to administer within video-
conferencing than virtual reality environments. Some researchers, however, have
realised the importance of body cues and gestures within virtual reality environments
and are seeking to replicate them (Marsh, 1998; Rime & Schiaratura, 1991).
Ultimately, there is a need for accurate contextualisation of data for all parties within
multimedia interactions. The more appropriate feedback parties receive about the
social aspects of that interaction, the easier it will be to develop social norms for
acceptable behaviours within these environments.
Finally, the implications of recording learning interactions should not be under-
estimated. The simple act of recording users’ interactions can increase the sensitivity
of the data and the potential risks (e.g., repeated usage, out-of-context viewing,
editing). Initially it is important, where possible, to obtain the user’s permission to
record information. If this is impractical then feedback to users who are recorded
must be provided. Any later changes to those who will be viewing the information
should also be provided to the user. Finally an attempt to try and contextualise data
(e.g., date stamping, country of origin for transmission) should be made. For highly
sensitive information, digital watermarking and watercasting should be considered.
With the aid of these mechanisms, the copying and editing of multimedia data can be
identified and potentially traced (Adams & Sasse, 2001; Brown, Perkins, &
Crowcroft, 1999; Craver, Yeo, & Yeung, 1998). Copied multimedia data, once
identified, could be traced back to its origins. However, these mechanisms are not
automated and thus rely on the user trawling through data trying to find out whether
their data is on public display somewhere. Furthermore, there is no mechanism that
would inform the person receiving the data that it has been tampered with against
the user’s wishes.
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THE FUTURE OF SECURITY FOR
ONLINE LEARNING
The rapid progress in providing innovative forms of online learning is opening up
many new learning opportunities. As these systems develop, the enrichment of
students’ learning potential throughout the world will be greatly enhanced. Students
can receive information throughout the world in text, audio, video and graphic forms.
A myriad of virtual worlds can mediate student interactions and support their learning
capabilities. However, with these developments comes a heavy burden of respon-
sibility. Ensuring usability in the security of these systems, their users and their data
will allow them to thrive and flourish. Avoiding these issues will ultimately result in
their downfall from the weight of users’ distrust.
With increasing threats to online programs, security will become a high priority
in the systems of the future. What is debatable, however, is how that security will be
approached. Current security methods manage potential risks with restrictive,
autocratic mechanisms that ignore users, their tasks and the organisational setting.
The result is a dramatic decrease in the usability of online programs. Another
approach is to develop security and its mechanisms for and with its users. Whichever
approach is taken, security is set to be the burning issue of the future, as users trust
the global online world less and the threats from unauthorised access increase.
CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that appropriate security mechanisms are essential to prevent
unauthorised access to learning materials on behalf of both providers and learners.
The poor usability of security mechanisms results in users’ insecure behaviours and
low motivation (Adams, 2001; Adams et al., 1997). These behaviours, in turn, present
(to security specialists) a stereotyped user who cannot be trusted and should not be
conversed with. This circle needs to be broken by improving communication between
security specialists and users and providing user-centred training and design of
security mechanisms. It is important to take this communication to a different level
than simply security specialists dictating to their users. The future, therefore, of
security design for online learning systems lies in collaboration between users and
experts to develop the usable mechanisms required for the future.
The other aspect of security we have addressed in this chapter is privacy,
including the need for socially acceptable behaviours in videoconferencing and
virtual reality environments. Again, the need for usable and appropriate user
feedback and control is essential for maintaining trust and confidence in the system
(Preece, 2000). Users need rapidly to learn socially acceptable behaviours when
working with systems that impose less rigid social protocols than familiar face-to-
face learning situations. Care also needs to be taken over how users’ images appear
to others and how they may be used out of context. Designers of online learning
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systems must recognise that people’s interpretation of images is strongly influenced
by real-world experience and may therefore be inaccurate in the electronic world.
Many of these issues are related to communication and control between the
providers of learning resources (at the organisational level) and the users, including
both the providers of particular learning materials and the learners. The balance
between these two bodies could affect users’ perceptions of trust levels, confidence
and legitimate use. Imposing mechanisms that circumvent communication or user
control may creates perceived feelings of distrust and a lack of confidence in the
providing organisation. Krull (1995) suggests that the appropriate use of authority is
direction, not control, since explicit, inflexible rules undermine users’ confidence.
Trust is undermined by force, sending a contradictory message to people that
prevents them from judging trade-offs for themselves or feeling part of the proposed
solution. A future direction for security would be the development of guidelines and
boundaries (but not restrictive controls) that encourage and nurture trust and allow
for the natural improvement of users’ secure and socially appropriate behaviours.
ENDNOTES
1 Constructivism is a psychological theory in collaborative learning virtual
environments. It highlights the importance of learning environment actions and
real interactions. For further information see Vygotsky (1978).
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